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A Symbolic Balanced Budget Amendment

Neal Devins*

Here we go again! Following budget summits in five of the past
ten years (1982, 1984, 1985, 1987 and 1989), 1 budget reform legislation in three of those years (1985, 1987 and 1990),2 and countless
legislative proposals and presidential appeals, the deficit will
reach $350 billion in fiscal year 1992-just enough to push the n~
tional debt over the $4 trillion mark. s The gross interest on this
debt ($315 billion in fiscal year 1993) has fast become the budget's
single greatest expenditure, and it now constitutes twenty percent
of all federal spending. 4 To put this imponderable figure into
perspective, the National Taxpayer's Union asks us to imagine a
bake sale to pay off the debt by selling bread at $1 per loaf: "730
loaves would have to be sold to each of the world's 5.2 billion
people. This is so much bread that-if it were all eaten at once
and converted to fat-everyone in the world would gain 145
pounds." 5
With the deficit's unrelenting, albeit predictable, growth, it
seemed a safe bet that a balanced budget constitutional amend-

• Associate Professor of Law, Lecturer in Government, The College of William and Mary.
Thanks to David Lee for research assistance.
1 See Pamela Fessler & Sharon Perkinson, Ghosts of Summits Past, 1990 Cong. Q. Wkly.
1460 (May 12, 1990).
2 Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-177, 99
Stat. 1038 (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.); Balanced Budget and
Emergency Deficit Control Reaffirmation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-119, 101 Stat. 754
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.); Budget Enforcement
Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
2U.S.C.).
s See George Hager, Is the Deficit Now Too Big for Congress to Tame?, 1992 Con g. Q.
Wkly. 1140 (May 2, 1992); Paul Simon, Balanced Budget Amendment, Chi. Trib., May 8,
1992, at C17.
4 See Simon, supra note 3.
5 See generally National Taxpayers Union, How Much is the National Debt? (1992).
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ment would get the requisite two-thirds House and Senate support
in June 1992. Mter all, the clamor for a budget amendment had
become thunderous these past few years. Thirty-two states had
called for a constitutional convention to consider such an amendment,6 and the 1986 and 1990 budget amendment proposals failed
by a total of eight votes. 7 Thanks, however, to a furious eleventh
hour campaign by Congress' Democratic leadership (resulting in
twelve Democrat co-sponsors voting against the amendment), the
1992 amendment proposal failed by nine votes. 8
The amendment-perhaps without Bill Clinton's support 9-will
be back next year. So will the item veto, impoundment, and who
knows how many other constitutional and statutory reform
proposals. These proposals neither die nor fade away, although
their titles and provisions do vary a bit from year to year. The
budget debate is as repetitive as it is important. Indeed, the only
thing that changes are the numbers. But the numbers are so staggering that it appears they do not change either. Over the past
decade, this debate has acquired a timeless quality-much like
Jerry Lewis' annual Muscular Dystrophy telethon, although no one
claims the participants in this epic battle as their kids.
Crocodile tears notwithstanding, 10 the failure of the 1992 budget
amendment is hardly cause for despair. Aside from creating
havoc for a judiciary ill-suited to interpreting it, and perhaps shifting a modicum of budgetary power from the Congress to the
White House, the amendment would have had little impact. It
seemed more an invitation for smoke screens and mirrors to conceal deficit spending than a promising vehicle to solve our budget

6 See E. Donald Elliot, Constitutional Conventions and the Deficit, 1985 Duke LJ. 1077,
1078 (1985) (citing Committee on Federal Legislation, An Analysis of State Resolutions
Calling for a Constitutional Convention to Propose a Balanced Budget Amendment, 40 The
Rec. of the Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York 71 0 (1985)).
7 S. Rep. No. 103, 102d Con g., 1st Sess. 3 (1991) [hereinafter Senate Report}.
8 See John R. Crawford, Defeat of Budget Amendment Fans Anti-Deficit Flames, 1992
Cong. Q_. Wkly. 1683, 168~5. 1687 Uune 13, 1992); DavidS. Cloud, Amendment's Fragile
Bloc of Backers ... Undone by Last Minute Defections, 1992 Cong. Q. Wkly. 1684, 1684-85
Uune 13, 1992).
9 Clinton's economic proposal places little emphasis on reducing the deficit.
Specifically, while proposing roughly $300 billion in spending cuts by 1996, Clinton would
also increase spending on new public works programs by $220 billion. See Michael Wines,
The 1992 Campaign: The Republicans; Bush Attacks Clinton Economic Plan as "Big Mistake,~
N.Y. Times, July 21, 1992, at Al4. Although economic growth may also reduce the deficit,
Clinton's plan estimates a $150 billion reduction in a $4 trillion deficit by 1996. See Id.
10 See The Vote on the Amendment, Wash. Post, June 14, 1992, at C6.
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woes. To balance the budget, the executive and legislative
branches must take the heat for reducing expenditures and/or increasing revenues. Automatic mechanisms, especially those with a
kick-out provision, cannot accomplish this objective.
That hard budgetary choices must be made does not make obsolete either a balanced budget amendment or structural changes in
the budgetary process. A purely symbolic budget amendment
mjght do some good and is unlikely to do much harm. More significantly, the statutorily-defined roles of Congress and the President
are in need of adjustment. Specifically, the President should play
the predominant role in defining budget aggregates, leaving
Congress the task of establishing program priorities in conjunction
with the White House. 11 Make no mistake, these measures are no
substitute for tax increases, program cuts and other traditional
tools to attack the deficit. But these measures will make it easier
for the elected branches to work together in solving the deficit criSIS.

This essay makes the case for a hybrid constitutional-statutory
approach to budget reform, combining a symbolic balanced budget amendment with statutory realignment of budgetary responsibilities. An examination of the correlation between legislative-executive budgetary roles and the growth of the deficit shows that
the White House is better equipped than the Congress to determine budget aggregates. Moreover, a review of budget reform in
the 1980s highlights both the allure and likely failure of automatic
spending mechanisms. At the same time, an analysis of the recent
balanced budget amendment proposal reveals that it suffers the
same (and more) failures as the 1980s' automatic mechanisms. This
essay proposes a hybrid approach to budget reform, with a symbolic balanced budget amendment as the necessary first step in
solving the deficit mess.

11 See Louis4fisher, Federal Budget Doldrums: The Vacuum in Presidential Leadership,
50 Pub. Admin. Rev. 693, 699 (Nov./Dec. 1990); The Balanced Budget: Hearings Before the
House Comm. on the Budget, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (Vol. II) (1992) [hereinafter Hearings]
(statement of Rep. David Obey).
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I. THE BALANCE OF POWER IN BUDGETARY POLITJCS12

The Constitution places the power of the purse with Congress. 1S
The prohibition on drawing money from the Treasury "but in
Consequence of Appropriations made by Law"14 reflects the
framers' fear of the consequences of centralizing the powers of the
purse and the sword. 15 As James Madison wrote in The Federalist
No. 58: "This power of the purse may, in fact, be regarded as the
most complete and effectual weapon with which any constitution
can arm the immediate representatives of the people .... "16
While the "legislative department alone has access to the pockets of the people, " 17 the President's budgetary role is far from de
minimis. Through the qualified veto power and the power to recommend, Congress must pay attention to the budget sensibilities of
the White House. Nonetheless, the President's budgetary role is
clearly subordinate to that of Congress. Congress determines
funding levels and establishes parameters for the expenditure of
appropriated funds. Although the power to recommend, and especially the power to veto, enable the President to communicate
vigorously his views to Congress and participate actively in the
process, Congress makes the ultimate decision about whether and
to what extent executive sentiments should prevail.
Through its control of budgetary decision-making, Congress is
also empowered to create formal mechanisms of communication
between the executive and the legislature on budgetary matters.
Prior to 1921, the President had no statutory responsibilities for
12 Portions of the following section are borrowed from Neal Devins, Budget Reform and
the Balance of Powers, 31 Wm. &: Mary L. Rev. 993,998-1004 (1990) .
13 See Abner Mikva, Congress: The Purse, the Purpose, and the Power, 21 Ga. L. Rev. 1,
1-2 (1986); Louis Fisher, How Tighdy Can Congress Draw the Purse Strings?, 83 Am. J. Int'l
Law 758,761-62 (1989); Kate Stith, Congress' 'Power of the Purse, 97 Yale L.J. 1343, 1344
(1988); Mickey Edwards, Of Conservatives and Kings, 24, 26 (Spring 1989). But see J.
Gregory Sidak, The President's Power of the Purse, 1989 Duke LJ. 1162, 1166-72 (1989) (the
Executive should be unitary, and the Appropriations Clause of the Constitution was never
intended to be used as a means for Congress to encroach on Executive authority).
14 U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
15 In the words of Montesquieu, who greatly influenced the framers: "Were the executive power to determine the raising of public money, otherwise than by giving its consent,
liberty would be at an end; because it would become legislative in the most important point
of legislation." Baron de Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, Bk. XI, § 6 at 160 (Thomas
Nugented.,1949).
16 The Federalist No. 58, at 350 Qames Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987).
17 The Federalist No. 48, at 310 Qames Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987).
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submitting a budget. 18 The President's formal role began with the
Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 (1921 Act), 19 which Congress
enacted in response to the huge national debt accumulated during
World War I. The 1921 Act required the President to construct
and submit an annual budget, but it allowed Congress complete
freedom to alter the budget.20 Congress was expected to coordinate its revenue and spending decisions with the President's budgetary recommendations. The President was supposed to be responsible for overall budget aggregates, with Congress retaining
the right to set priorities within those aggregates. 21
Although the 1921 Act accorded greater budgetary responsibility to the President, it did not alter the fundamental balance of
power between Congress and the President. 22 The President's responsibility to establish budget aggregates was more than tempered by Congress' power to increase or decrease the President's
budget by a simple majority vote. The 1921 Act thus respected
two essential constitutional principles: the President's responsibility for his own proposals and Congress' ultimate responsibility for
appropriations, subject only to the President's veto. Under the
1921 Act, Congress did not surrender or dilute its fiscal prerogatives, nor invade any executive prerogatives. In fact, the 1921 Act
did not subordinate executive prerogatives.
Congress sought again to protect its budgetary prerogatives,
and preserve the balance of power between the executive and itself, when it enacted the Congressional Budget and Impoundment
Control Act of 1974 (Budget Act).2 3 Congress passed the Budget
Act in response to the impoundment controversy of the early
18 See Louis Fisher, Presidential Spending Power !}.S5 (1975) (discussing presidential duties in budget matters prior to the 1921 Budget and Accounting Act).
19 Pub. L. No. 67-1S, 42 Stat 20 (1921).
20 See Fisher, supra note 18, at S4.
21 See Louis Fisher, Constitutional Conflicts Between Congress and the President 226-27
(1985).
22 As stated in the House Repon:
It will doubtless be claimed by some that this is an Executive budget and that

the duty of making appropriations is a legislative rather than Executive prerogative. The plan outlined does provide for an Executive initiation of the
budget, but the President's responsibility ends when he has prepared the
budget and transmitted it to Congress.
H.R. Rep. No. 14, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7 (1921 ).
2!1 Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat 297 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §621 and 31 U.S.C. §
SOl (1974)).
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1970s, in which President Nixon claimed that the executive could
refuse to spend appropriated funds if he judged such refusal to be
in the national interest. 24 Presidential impoundments threatened
the budgetary balance of power. By withholding appropriations,
the President could control aggregates and priorities.
The Budget Act contained a number of provisions designed to
strengthen congressional control over fiscal affairs. Under the
Budget Act, presidential rescissions of appropriated funds required both Senate and House approval. 2 5 The Budget Act also
created budget committees in the House and Senate, 26 established
the Congressional Budget Office to supply technical support, Z7 and
required the adoption of budget resolutions to set overall limits on
budget aggregates (such as total outlays and revenues) 28 and
permit debate on spending priorities. 29 In formulating its budget
resolutions since 1974, Congress has often applied economic,
technical and policy assumptions different from those presented in
the executive budget. 30
The principal consequence of this transformation was fiscal irresponsibility. The Budget Act hinged on a centralized process, the
budget resolution. Yet Congress, unlike the quintessentially cen24 See generally Ralph S. Abascal &: John R. Kramer, Presidential Impoundment Part 1:
Historical Genesis and Constitutional Framework, 62 Geo. L.J . 1549, 1549-50 (1974)
(considering President Nixon 's assertion of impoundment authority in late 1972 and early
1973 an infringement of Congress' budgetary authority, Congress sought to assert its position); Louis Fisher, Funds Impounded by the President: The Constitutional Issue, 38 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 124, 125-26 (1969) (when President impounds funds because he thinks a program ~unwise, wasteful or inexpedient," a constitutional issue is raised because the President
no longer acts on the basis of legislative budgetary authority); Cathy S. Neuren , Note,
Addressing the Resurgence of Presidential Budgetmaking Initiative: A Proposal to Reform
the Impoundment Control Act of 1974, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 693, 70~4 (1984) (Nixon's bold assertion of impoundment authority was "final straw" for Congress) .
25 Pub. L. No. 93-344, §§ 1012, 1017, 88 Stat. 333-34, 337-39 (codified as amended at 31
U.S.C. §§ 1401, 1402, 1407). The President could defer the spending of funds, subject to a
one-house veto. Id., § 1013, 88 Stat. at 334-35 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 1403).
The Supreme Court struck down one-house legislative vetoes in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919
(1983).

26 Pub. L. No. 93-344, §§ 101-102, 88 Stat. at 299-302.
Z7 ld., §§ 201-203, 88 Stat. at 302-05 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 601-603).
28 ld., §§ 301,302,88 Stat. at 306-09 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. §§ 1322, 1323).
29 Id., § 305, 88Stat. at 310-12 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 1326). Through the use
of a congressional budget adopted in concurrent resolutions, Congress sets "macro" policy
and allocates the outlays and oudget authority among a number of broad categories, such as
national defense, health and agriculture. Congress is still supposed to formulate and fund
specific programs through regular appropriation bills, but within the broad outlines of the
budget resolution. Allen Schick, Legislation, Appropriations, and Budgets: The
Development of Spending Decision-Making in Congress 41-43 (1984).
30 Allen Schick et al., Con g. Research Service, Manual on the Federal Budget Process 5
(1984).
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tralized executive, is strongly decentralized. Whereas the Office
of Management and Budget must answer to the President, and
therefore serves as the White House's authoritative voice on budget matters, the Congressional Budget Office has less institutional
clout because it is not answerable to any of the 535 members for
which it speaks. 31 These institutional differences have contributed
to the budget deficit in two quite distinct ways.
First, by
devaluing the President's budgetary role, Congress and the White
House both pay more attention to program priorities than budget
aggregates. Consequently, anticipated revenues have been overestimated in order to make way for greater spending. Congress accomplished this mischief by voting on generous ceilings in the
budget resolution, while the President simply manipulated his aggregates to accommodate policy preferences. 32 Second, by centralizing its budgetary decision-making through both the budget
resolution and increased reliance on omnibus appropriations
housed in a single continuing resolution (rather than thirteen separate appropriations bills), Congress became vulnerable to centralized but ill-conceived budget planning. 33
Witness the exponential growth of budget deficits since 1981.
Prior to 1981, the accumulated national debt stood at roughly one
trillion dollars. Although over-optimistic budget projections made
deficits common (occurring in all but five years since 1950), deficit
spending averaged only 5.1 percent of total outlays from 19501980. 34 That all changed in 1981. Riding the wake of Ronald
Reagan's dramatic 1980 election victory, the Reagan administration
successfully pushed through Congress a new vision of economic
growth. Believing that a tax cut would spur more than enough
economic growth to offset lost revenues, Congress slashed taxes by
an estimated $150 billion annually, while reducing expenditures

31 For a related argument, see Fisher, supra note 11, at 696-97.
32 See Louis Fisher, The Politics of Shared Power: Congress and the Executive 206 (2d
ed. 1987).
33 See Fisher, supra note 11, at 696-97. See also Neal Devins, Appropriations Redux: A
Critical Look at Fiscal Year 1988, Duke L.f. 389,392-96 (1988); Rudolph Penner, An Appraisal
of the Congressional Budget Process, in 'the Budget Process: Exerc1sing Political Choice 67
(Allen Schick ed., 1986); Allen Schick, How The Budget Was Won and Lost, n President and
Con.r;ess: Assessing Reagan's First Year 26-27 (Norman Ornstein ed., 1985).
3 See Paul Peterson, The New Politics of Deficits, in The New Direction In American
Politics 367 Oohn E. Chubb&. Paul E. Peterson eds., 1985).
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by less than $50 billion. ~ 5 Things did not work out as planned.
Supply side economics could not turn around restrictive Federal
Reserve Board action and a sluggish economy. ~ 6 As a result, the
Reagan administration deficit estimate was off by over $100 billion. ~7
The 1981 deficit debacle reveals the failings of the 1974 Act
structure. With neither branch taking the heat for unrealistic budget aggregates, the likelihood -of widely supported social policy
objectives (such as increasing programmatic expenditures or decreasing taxes) controlling aggregate figures was greatly increased.
Indeed, while 1981 was a watershed, a comparison of the five
years before and the five years after the 1974 Act reveals that the
annual deficit had already quadrupled. ~ 8 1981 proved so extraordinary because the Reagan administration's economic assumptions were more daring and because Congress' endorsement
of supply side economics in its budget resolution cabined alternative formulations. In other words, by avoiding the necessity of
working separately on thirteen appropriations bills as well as tax
reform (where the Reagan administration program "would have
been chopped to bits by successive committee and subcommittee
action"), "( t] he budget resolution gave [Reagan] the centralizing
vehicle he needed. ~ 9
However, 1981 did much more than produce a mammoth singleyear deficit. Its unrealistic economic assumptions set in motion
subsequent deficits. By 1985, budget deficits were so outrageous
that Congress felt compelled to act. Its solution was the peculiar
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Deficit Control Act (Gramm-Rudman).
Gramm-Rudman represents something of a hybrid. In enacting the
bill, Congress proved it was no longer willing to trust either its
own internal budgetary process or the President's. 40
Consequently, in both Gramm-Rudman's original form and its 1987

~5 Id. at 382 (citing Cong. Q. Almanac, vol. 37 at 93, 259 (1981)).
36 I d. at 382-84.
37 I d. at 384-85.

38 See John Crawford, Balanced Budget Amendment Suddenly Comes to Life, reprinted
in 1992 Cong. Q. Wkly. 1234-35 (May 9, 1992) (National Taxpayers Union Chart).
~9 Fisher, supra note 11, at 697.
40 Jack Brooks, Gramm-Rudman: Can Congress and the President Pass This Buck?, 64 Tex.
L. Rev. 131, 131 (1985) (labeling Gramm-Rudman "a wholesale abdication of constitutional
responsibility").
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reincarnation, an automatic sequestration procedure ensures that
the budget conforms to deficit reduction targets. 41 Specifically, if
the regular appropriations process does not produce a budget
within Gramm-Rudman's prescribed deficit reduction target, 42 the
President's Office of Management and Budget prepares a sequestration order to be issued shortly after the start of the fiscal
year. 43 In order to limit executive control, Congress has specified
mandatory formulas for allocating the spending cuts. 44 The executive, therefore, cannot use the sequestration order as an opportunity to control budget priorities. 45 As Senator Phil Gramm (RTex) explained:
Let me make note of ... why this is significantly different than impoundment, and why it is significantly different than any line-item
veto approach. We all know that the difficulties in those procedures is that Members of Congress are jealous of their powers, and
they do not want to transfer power to the executive branch .
This bill does not create new powers.46

Although Gramm-Rudman does not alter the fundamental budgetary balance of power, Congress' utilization of automatic mechanisms and reliance on entities outside its control paved the way
for the further abdication of budgetary responsibility. As
41 See generally Edward Davis &. Robert Keith, Cong. Research Service, Debt-Limit
Increase and 1985 Balanced Budget Act Reaffirmation: Summary of Public Law 100-19 (H.J.
Res. 324) (1987).
42 Under Gramm-Rudman, the calculation of the maximum expenditure level within the
deficit reduction target is made by the Office of Management and Budget. The Balanced
Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-177, 99 Stat. 1038
(codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
411 Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Reaffirmation Act of 1987, Pub. L.
No. 100-119, § 102(b)(1), 101 Stat. 754, 767 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 902(b)(l)
(1989)).

44 For a description of this process, see Kate Stith, Rewriting the Fiscal Constitution: The
Case of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, 76 Cal. L. Rev. 593, 630-33 (1988).
45 The White House, however, can reap benefits from the sequestration order. For example, PresideH Bush threatened to veto the FY 1990 budget bill and consequently let the
Gramm-Rudman sequestration take effect in order to further both his budget priorities and
his bargaining posiuon with Congress. See Jodie Allen, How the Administration is Beating
Congress in the Budget Game, Wash. Post, Nov. 8, 1989, at B3; Tom Kenworthy&. Helen
Dewar, Bush Demands Hill Set New Budget Cuts, Wash. Post, Nov. 3, 1989, at AI. In other
words, a President willing to let across-the-board budget cuts take hold can put pressure on
Congress to draft a budget bill that matches pn:sidential priorities. This proposition, of
course, assumes that Congress would disfavor the Gramm-Rudman sequestration order more
than the President. If the reverse were true, that is, the President disfavored across-theboard cuts more than Congress, Gramm-Rudman would enhance legislative bargaining
power.
46 131 Cong. Rec. 25,840 (1985) (statement of Sen. Phil Gramm).
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Congressmanjack Brooks (D-Tex) wrote in his lament of GrammRudman: "Active efforts to cure a problem may be controversial
and are seldom risk-free. It is tempting to believe that avoiding
blame is a safer course. " 47 He added, "Gramm-Rudman demonstrates once again that political accountability is an extremely difficult problem for the American system of government. "48
Gramm-Rudman, in fact, exacerbated the failings of the 1974
Act. Rather than compelling realism, the Act spawned budget
gimmickry. As former Congressional Budget Office head Rudolph
Penner noted:
"Gramm-Rudman produced forecasts that
promised to achieve deficit goals when there was little hope of
coming close to them. It spawned accounting gimmicks that
seemed to make the deficit lower than it really was. " 49 Examples
of this include shifting costs away from the present year to an earlier year and raising revenue in the current year at the expense of
future revenue. 50
Another tactic was for the Office of
Management and Budget to limit program cuts by grossly overestimating revenues. 51 Senate Budget Committee Chair Jim Sasser,
expressing frustration at this subterfuge, complained that ''we have
ended up with two sets of books.. . . First, we keep a set for the
Gramm-Rudman game-and this is a useful fiction manipulated to
give the illusion of progress-and second, we keep a set of books
that are the real books. This is the real deficit. "52
Gramm-Rudman also makes centralization in budgeting through
the ongoing use of continuing resolutions a near certainty. 53
Appropriations subcommittees are unlikely to bring their bills
forward because some cuts in a committee's appropriations may
be necessitated as the committee struggles to meet deficit- reduction goals in subcommittees. In other words, a subcommittee that
makes the requisite spending cuts may nonetheless have their bill

47 Brooks, supra note 40, at 135.
48 Id. at 137.
49 Rudolph Penner, No Will, No Way, N.Y. Times, May 20, 1992, at A23.
50 Penner, for example, points to the government's willingness to forego future revenues
by allowing borrowers to encourage early repayment of high interest government loans at
lower rates to reduce short term deficits. ld. See also Fisher, supra note 11, at 698.
51 See Jackie Calmes, Despite Tough Talk, Big Cuts Unlikely, 1990 Cong. Q. Wkly. 218,
218-19 (Jan. 27, 1990).
52 Budget Reform Proposals, Joint Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Governmental
Affairs and the Senate Comm. on the Budget, JOist Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1989).
53 See Devins, supra note 33, at 395.
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cut another time to make up for other subcommittees who do not
meet their deficit-reduction goals. 54 The current system, by err
couraging last minute action, shifts control away from decentralized appropriation subcommittees to the more centralized
Appropriations Committee, which hammers out the entire budget
in the form of a continuing resolution. 55
Unrealistic budget projections and centralized budgeting are the
hallmarks of Gramm-Rudman. This outcome should come as no
surprise. From 1986-1991 (when deficit targets were in place), the
nation's deficit rose $1.2 trillion. 56 During this period, the actual
deficit exceeded deficit-reduction targets by more than $400 billion. 57
The failure of Gramm-Rudman prompted further reforms in
1990. The Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 substituted heretofore
impossible-to-meet deficit-reduction goals with spending guidelines. 5 8 These guidelines, by placing separate upper limits on de-

54 As David Obey, chairman of an appropriations subcommittee, explained on the House
floor:
I warn you, even though people will give us these pious pronouncements
now supJ.>orting 1~ individual appropriations bills, so long as GrammRudman ts on the books there is an incentive for every committee around
here not to bring their bill out to floor, because even if they cut their own
bill and meet the spending limitations required under a budget resolution,
that does not guarantee tftat every other committee will perform, and so
they can wind up having their bill cut twice.
134 Gong. Rec. H68-69 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1988).
55 See Devins, supra note 33, at 396-400.
56 Congressional Research Service specialists Robert Keith and Edward Davis prepared
the following table comparing actual deficits to deficit targets:
Fiscal
Year

Maximum
Deficit Amount

Actual
Deficit

Actual Deficit
Over Target

1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991

171.9
144
144
136
100
64

221.2
149.8
155.2
153.5
220.5
268.7

949.3
5.8
11.2
17.5
10.5
204.7

TOTAL
(in billions
of dollars)

759.9

1,168.9

409

Robert Keith 8c Edward Davis, Cong. Research Service, A Balanced Federal Budget
Major Statutory Provisions 3 (Apr. 30, 1992).
57Id
58 George Hager, New Rules to Old Game, 1991 Cong. Q. Wkly. ~~6 (Feb. 9, 1991).
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fense, domestic and international spending, were intended to keep
expenditures stable. The problem is that the deficit once again
exploded. The combination of a costly savings and loan bailout
and a persistent recession that limited revenues resulted in a
deficit estimated at more than $350 billion for fiscal year 1992, the
Act's first year in operation. 59 Moreover, with interest on the national debt well in access of $200 billion and rising quickly, the
Budget Enforcement Agreement (which ignores the problem on
revenues altogether) cannot hope to tame the deficit. 60
What needs to occur is a return to the pre-197 4 arrangement of
presidential control over aggregates and legislative control over
priont1es. Automatic mechanisms like Gramm-Rudman invite
abuse by deflecting institutional accountability. Moreover, as
Louis Fisher and others have observed, "reforms have appealed to
institutional weaknesses rather than to institutional strengths. By
looking to Congress for comprehensive action, the unity and leadership that must come from the President have been unwittingly
weakened. "61
Make no mistake about it. This re-transformation will not eliminate deficits. Prior to 1974, optimistic economic forecasts by the
President typically resulted in modest deficits. 62 That is not likely
to change-especially with interest payments on the national debt
in excess of $200 billion. Rather than a panacea, this retransformation is a necessary first step on the path to fiscal salvation.

II. THE IMBALANCE OF A BALANCED BUDGET AMENDMENT

Budget reform is about more than deficits. It is also about the
balance of power. Budgetary reform that enables the President's
budget to assume a status superior to Congress' is contrary to the
constitutional principle of checks and balances. The Budget and
Accounting Act of 1921 and the Impoundment Control Act of 1974

59 See Hager, supra note 3, at 1141; John Cranford, Balanced-Budget Amendment
Suddenly Comes to Life, 1992 Cong. Q. Wkly. 1233 (May 9, 1992).
60 See Hager, supra note 3, at 1145.
61 See Fisher, supra note 11, at 699.
62 See Peterson, supra note 34, at 367-70.
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reinforce this principle. Gramm-Rudman, while limiting legislative
discretion, is not contrary to this principle. Under our existing
constitutional scheme, 63 we should disfavor proposals that threaten
to alter the balance of power. Recent proposals to constitutionally mandate a balanced budget, to grant the President
power to veto (or reduce) any item in an appropriation, and to
enhance the President's impoundment authority must be examined
with reference, not just to these devices' budget savings potential,
but also to the balance of power.
Proposals to grant the President power to disapprove or reduce
any item of appropriation through an item veto or enhanced impoundment authority explicitly seek to restructure the balance of
power on budgetary matters. 64 Under these proposals, executive
prerogatives trump legislative desires unless a two-thirds supermajority in Congress overrides the item veto or impoundment decision. 65 These proposals should be disfavored for this reason alone.
Worse yet, item veto and impoundment authority is likely to do
little to solve the deficit problem. State experiences with these
devices, even assuming that they are instructive in understanding
the federal system, 66 raise doubts about the deficit-reduction
power of such structural change. Partisan politics, not fiscal
restraint, seems to be the animating force of state experiences. 67
State experiences also reveal an instrumental judicial role in
establishing the scope of these budgetary powers, suggesting that
the dimensions of presidential item veto and impoundment power

63 For an intriguing argument as to why the deficit problem warrants a restructuring of
the federal government, see generally Elliot, supra note 6; see also William Stubblebine,
Fiscal Balance and the Federal Constitution, 11:2 Ceo. Mason U. L. Rev. 125 (1988) (arguing
that institutional defects require amending the Constitution to achieve fiscal balance) .
64 See Devins, supra note 12, at 1017-18; Louis Fisher &. Neal Devins, How Successfully
Can the State's Item Veto be Transferred to the President?, 75 Ceo. LJ. 159, 192-93 (1986).
Reform proponents claim that the increasing use of omnibus legislation "helps restore" the
appropriate balance of power between President and Congress. 135 Cong. Rec. S615 (daily
ed. Jan. 25, 1989). This claim is incorrect. Although omnibus legislation changes the nature
of the exchange between the White House and Congress, a President who is willing to use
his veto wields enormous power in negotiations with Congress. See Devins, supra note 33,
at 406-14.
65 See Devins, supra note 12, at 1010.
66 State and federal budget systems are too different for state experiences to be considered a reliable predictor of federal efforts. See Fisher&. Devins, supra note 64, at 162, 18588; Devins, supra note 12, at 1004-15. For an opposing view, see Stephen Moore, What the
States Can Teach Congress About Balancing the Budget, Heritage Found. Rep. 751 (Feb. 6,
1990).
67 See Fisher&. Devins, supra note 64, at 176; Devins, supra note 12, at 1004-15.
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would be decided in the courts. 68 Moreover, there is little reason
to think that the President would accomplish much in the way of
budget savings with these powers. A 1992 Congressional Research
Service analysis suggests a maximum savings of roughly $500
million a year. 69 More strikingly, President Reagan's annual list of
"wasteful, unnecessary, or low priority spending projects" totaled
less than a billion dollars in savings.7° With annual deficits of $200
billion or more, these savings hardly warrant the substitution of
presidential priorities and judicial edicts for legislative desires.
The balanced budget amendment is supposedly cut from a different cloth. The leading proposal, sponsored by Texas Democrat
Charles Stenholm in the House and Illinois Democrat Paul Simon in
the Senate, mandates a balanced budget without explicitly granting the President any new powers.
Specifically, starting
(depending on ratification) as soon as fiscal year 1995, "total outlays of the United States for any fiscal year shall not exceed total
receipts to the United States for that year, unless Congress approves a specific excess of outlays over receipts by [a] three-fifths
. . . vote. " 71 To ensure that balancing the budget "be a shared
governmental responsibility, " 72 the proposed amendment requires
the President to transmit a balanced budget to Congress prior to
each fiscal year. 73 According to a Senate Judiciary Committee
report, this language will further collaboration be tween the
branches in fiscal planning and "is not intended to grant the
President additional formal authority or power over budget
legislation or spending. "74
The question remains, however, whether this amendment will
deliver what it promises, namely a balanced budget, without disrupting the balance of powers. The answer, unfortunately, is no.

68 See Fisher &. Devins, supra note 64, at 168-78.
69 See 138 Cong. Rec. S5882 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 1992) (Cong. Research Service Evaluation
of GAO Line-Item Veto Repon) .
70 The Line Item Veto: Hearings on SJ. Res. 14, SJ Res. 23 and SJ Res. 31 Before the
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, lOlst Cong., 1st Sess.
294-95 (1989) (statement of Louis Fisher). It is posssible that President Reagan would have
been willing to cut more than a billion dollars had he been given a mandate to reduce the
deficit through an item veto. Nonethelesss, the gap between annual deficits and Reagan's
pr~osal reveals the difficulty of aggressive presidential use of the item veto.
Senate Repon, supra note 7, at 6.
72 Id. at 8.
73Id
741d
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The amendment will severely disadvantage the Congress vis-a-vis
the White House in fiscal policy. Moreover, the amendment will
thrust unelected judges into the midst of the budget thicket.
Worse yet, the amendment is more likely to prompt GrammRudman-type gimmickry and deception than the hard economic
choices necessary to address the deficit.

A. l-Wly the balance of powers will be disrupted.

Amendm~nt

sponsors make the straightforward claim that their
proposal does not change the balance of powers because "[n] o
branch of government is disadvantaged relative to the other. " 75
The President is not given impoundment, item veto or item reduction power; the rights and responsibilities of Congress are unaffected, except in prohibiting deficits. 76 The risk of overreaching
court interpretations is likewise tossed aside because of the
amendment's clarity, Congress' ability to legislatively respond to
court decisions, and inherent standing and political question limits
that will minimize the judiciary's role. 77 Moreover, the risk of
putting taxing and spending in the hands of unelected judges "is a
small risk compared to the certain danger of continuing on the
current course. "78
This analysis is too simplistic. Executive power may well be
enhanced either by implementing legislation or executive claims of
implicit grants of authority. Congressional power may be diminished by this provision and because the three-fifths override tends
to favor presidential prerogatives. Finally, issues of court interpretation are troubling.
These conclusions are driven by a fundamental question: What
happens if Congress doesn't balance the budget either because it
cannot or does not want to? The incentives to satisfy constituent
and national interests through spending, the disincentives to raise
tax rates, the willingness of elected government to make unrealistic
75 Hearings, supra note 11, at 47 (Vol. II) (statement of Rep. Stephen Neal).
76Id
77 See 138 Cong. Rec. E2168 (daily ed. June 10, 1992) (statement of Rep. Charles
Stenholm).
78 Hearings, supra note 11, at 99 (Vol. II) (materials submitted by Sen. Paul Simon).
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budget assumptions and a $4 trillion national debt all suggest the
reasonableness of this question. Budget amendment proponents,
however, do not like this question. The Senate Judiciary
Committee Report claims that "[s] tatutory efforts are vulnerable
to a change of heart or weakening of resolve" while a constitutional amendment commands respect and dutiful obedience because "[b]oth the President and Members of Congress swear an
oath to uphold the Constitution. " 79 Put another way: "[B]ecause
we have not been successful in anything else, and because we have
run out of other ideas, we should adopt the balanced budget
amendment. "80 Nonetheless, this question demands an answer and
the answer is disturbing.
Congress' inability or unwillingness to comply with a budget
amendment would mean that the executive and/ or the judiciary
will put the amendment into effect. Executive power might be increased in one of four ways. First, Congress might statutorily
grant impoundment, item veto, taxing or other budget-making
powers to the President. As the Senate Judiciary Committee recognized when it reported on a budget amendment proposal in
1984: 'This provision ... does not invest in the President any new
authority to impound appropriated funds; Congress, however,
may choose to amend existing impoundment statutes (consistent
with the Constitution) and establish greater authority in the
President to carry out his Section 1 obligations by impounding
funds. "81 Second, absent an explicit grant of power, the President
may nonetheless argue in court that only through the elimination
or reduction of items in an appropriation can he com ply with his
constitutional obligation to balance the budget. 82 Otherwise, so
the argument goes, Congress' violation of its balanced budget
obligations will compel the President to breach his constitutional
responsibilities. Third, whenever the President disagrees with the
balanced budget submitted by Congress, he can place the Congress
in a difficult position (unless two-thirds of Congress overrides his
veto). Take Louis Fisher's example of the President and Congress

79 Senate Report, supra note 7, at 5.
80 Hearings, supra note 11, at 207 (Vol. I) (statement of former Rep. Bill Frenzel) .
81 ld. at 195 (Vol. I) (statement of Louis Fisher).
82 See Proposed Constitutional Amendments to Balance the Budget: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Economic and Commercial Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, I 01 st
Cong., 2d Sess. 110-11 (1990) [hereinafter Hearings II] (statement of Prof. Walter Dellinger).
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disagreeing about the amount of money needed to maintain
governmental programs-with the President insisting that less
money is necessary to maintain existing governmental operations:
"Congress will be at a political disadvantage. Either it will go on
record as wanting higher taxes than the President or it will have to
bear the burden of cutting social programs. The President escapes
both chores. " 811 Congress' only way out of this dilemma is to
succumb to the President's budget figures.
Fourth, the
requirement that a three-fifths majority approve deficit spending
also improves the President's bargaining position. To the extent
that the President is the head of his political party, presidential
support will become a key ingredient in amassing a three-fifths
majority. 84
Minority factions in Congress would likewise benefit by the
three-fifths requirement. Since two-fifths of either house could
block deficit spending, accommodations to at least some minority
interests will often be a prerequisite to securing supermajority
support. The outcome of this anti-majoritarian device would be
neutralizing the gap of power between the majority Democratic
and minority Republican parties. Democratic Congressman Jack
Brooks put it bluntly: "They [the Republicans] could extract any
demand they wish to in order to permit vital legislation to go forward. Is it any wonder that all but a handful of the minority
party in this House should embrace such a scheme?" 85 Brooks'
concern is certainly rooted in partisan interests but it is more than
that. It is about restructuring internal congressional operations by
"enshrin [ing] the principle of minority rule on the most important
issues [Congress] deals with; namely, economic issues."86
The budget amendment implicates more than executive-legislative relations and internal congressional operations. It also sets the
stage for complex and divisive budget issues to be resolved by unelected judges. To start, amendment sponsors recognize that "the

811 See Hearings, supra note 11, at 192-93 (Vol. I) (statement of Louis Fisher).
84 In the words of Rep. David Obey (D-Wisc.), this demand for supermajority support
"simply increases what you are going to have to pay out in order to buy off enough people
to impose any budget and economic policy." Id. at 7 (Vol. II) (testimony of Rep. David
Obey). Minority factions may demand reductions on majority-favored expenditures
and/or increases in minority-favored expenditures.
85 138 Cong. Rec. H4498 (daily ed. June 10, 1992) (statement of Rep. Jack Brooks).
86 Id. at H4500 (statement of Rep. David Obey).
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courts [might] be required to step in" and that "the final arbiter
will be, as in all constitutional matters, the Supreme Court. "ffl
Indeed, were the courts to invoke justiciability barriers to stay out
of this thicket, the budget amendment would become an unenforceable albatross-a visible and embarrassing showcase of the
federal government's inability to deal with the national debt. 88
Judicial involvement seems likely, however. Standing and the political question doctrine will not foreclose judicial review, especially since congressional sponsors recognize the possible need for
judicial enforcement. 89 Correlatively, state experiences, to the
extent that they are relevant, suggest active and far-ranging court
involvement. 90
What that means is ceaseless, nightmarish litigation. In the
words of Robert Bork (commenting on an earlier amendment proposal):
The language and the subject matter [of the amendment] are technical, so that almost endless opportunities for litigation, and hence
for judicial dominance in the budget process, exist. Terms must be
defined under endlessly varying circumstances; conventions about
statistics, accounting, budget making, and other arcane matters must
be probed and specified. The prospect may be for nightmare litigation that would be damaging both to the judiciary and to the budgetary process. 91

Judge Bork is correct. Interpretation problems are as plentiful
as are lawyers willing to file suit. Several witnesses in recent balanced budget hearings pointed to the following (and many more)

87 Hearings, supra note 11, at 99 (Vol. II) (materials submitted by Sen. Paul Simon).
88 Id. at 420-23 (Vol. II) (statement of Alan Morrison, Director of Public Citizens Litigation
Group).
89 See Note, The Balanced Budget Amendment: An Inquiry into Appropriateness, 96
HaJV. L. Rev. 1600, 1610-19 (1983) (standing and political question limitations will not prevent judicial enforcement of a balanced budget amendment); David A. Logan, Standing to
Sue: A Proposed Separation of Powers Analysis, 1984 Wise. L. Rev. 3'7, 59-62 (1984)
(standing barrier lowered when judiciary perceives Congress supports judicial enforcement
option). Amendment sponsor Charles Stenholm, while not disputing this conclusion, argued
that the judicial enforcement issue should be put aside because of Congress' power to limit
jurisdiction, standing and remedies. 138 Cong. Rec. H4568 (daily ed. June 10, 1992).
Congress' power to nullity a constitutional provision through limits on court power is subject to dispute, however. See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction 147-80
(1989).
90 See Hearings, supra note 11, at 19~97 (Vol. I) (statement of Louis Fisher).
91 Robert Bork, Would a Budget Amendment Work?, Wall St. J., Apr. 4, 1979, at 20.
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interpretation problems: 92 Are there any limits on the projected
rule of economic growth in crafting a balanced budget? Could the
President's budget proposal rely upon savings from programs that
Congress clearly favors? Do federal outlays include expenditures
on quasi-public entities like AMTRAK and the Postal Service? More
generally, how does one define such terms of art as "outlays,"
"receipts," "fiscal year," and "public debt?"
The risk of judicial involvement is much more than a problem
of malleable language. That problem inheres in many constitutional provisions. The budget amendment raises fundamentally
different concerns. Were the courts to mandate a balanced budget
through tax increases and the like, the judiciary would assume the
power of the purse. 9 ~ This is directly contrary to the constitutional design that accords broad powers to the judiciary precisely
because it "has no influence over either the sword or the purse. "9 4
For this reason, Alan Morrison closed his congressional testimony
on the budget amendment with the admonition that "if my
testimony has frightened you, that was my intent in giving it.
Each of you should ask yourselves whether you really want the
federal courts to control the federal government. "95

B. Why the budget deficit will remain

Amendment sponsors claim that the need to balance the budget
outweighs the risks of disrupting the balance of powers. That
might be true if the budget amendment were likely to accomplish
its objective. State experiences with balanced budget amendments, however, call into question the power of this constitutional
mandate. Moreover, the three-fifths supermajority requirement

92 See Hearings, supra note 11, at 41~8 (Vol. II) (statement, testimony and questioning of
Alan Morrison); ld. at 151-80 (Vol. 1) (statement, testimony, and questioning of Robert
Reischauer, Director of Congressional Budget Office; Hearings II, supra note 82, at 97-108
(statement of Prof. Henry P. Monaghan) .
9 ~ See Letter from Peter Shane, Prof. of Law, University of Iowa School of Law, to Rep.
Dave Nagle Qune 2, 1992), reprinted in 138 Gong. Rec. H4442-4444 (daily ed.June 10, 1992).
94 The Federalist No. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
95 Hearings, supra note 11, at 432 (Vol. II) (statement of Alan Morrison). This contention
is not far fetched. In Missouri v. Jenkins, the Supreme Court affirmed the power of the
federal courts to impose tax levies to ensure state and local government compliance with
court-<>rdered remedies. 495 U.S. 33 (1990).
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for deficit spending will not stand as a bulwark against growing
annual deficits. Instead, the moral command to comply with the
budget amendment will likely be overwhelmed by incentives to
maintain existing expenditures and disincentives to increase taxes.
Amendment boosters argue that state experiences support a
federal budget amendment. George Bush, in a nationwide address
on the eve of Congress' June 1992 budget amendment vote, emphasized that "forty-four of our states have some kind of a constitutional requirement for a balanced budget. It's time for the federal
government to follow their lead. "96
The Senate Judiciary
Committee Report which accompanied this year's budget amendment likewise noted that state budget amendments are "workable"
and that "[s]tate legislatures have learned to operate effectively
within the external limitation of their constitutions. " 97
This claim is overblown. While program cut-backs, salary
freezes and tax increases typify state austerity programs, a great
many states (especially large industrial states hard hit by the recession) have gone into debt. 98 State long-term borrowing also has
grown exponentially this past decade. 99 To the extent that states
rely on federal expenditures, a federal budget amendment will
likely shift costs to the states and exacerbate problems that states
now face in trying to balance their budgets. Moreover, the fact
that state balanced budget amendment requirements are met is
more a result of state accounting practices and gimmickry than a
truly balanced budget. For example, state balanced budget
amendments exempt capital spending for roads, education and
urban renewal. 100 Gimmickry too is widely used, "particularly
borrowing from pools of money outside the general fund, deferring aid to local governments and other outlays, and asset sales. " 101
State budgeting is different than federal budgeting for other
reasons. 102 States rely on their governors to balance their budget
96 28 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1032 (June 10, 1992).
97 Senate Report, supra note 7, at 5-6.

98 Hearings, supra note 11, at 202-10 (Vol. II) (statement of Steven Gold, Director of
Center for the Study of States).
99 Id. at 190 (Vol. I) (citing General Accounting Office, Budget Issues: State Balanced
Budget Requirements 42 (Dec. 1985)).
100 ld. at 204 (Vol. II) (statement of Steven Gold); Id. at 190 (Vol. I) (statement of Louis
FISher).
101 Id . at 202 (Vol. II} (statement of Steven Gold).
102 Id at 202-10 (Vol. II): Fisher&: Devins, supra note 64, at 162-65.
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through item veto, impoundment and other powers. 103 To truly
follow the states model, a reworking of the federal balance of
powers would also prove necessary.
That is not to say that the state system has failed. States are
much better at balancing their budgets than the federal government.104 But the state experience sends a cautionary message.
Deficits seem likely to remain, gimmicks seem likely to be used and
power will likely shift from Congress to the President.
The requirement that deficits be approved by three-fifths of
each House is intended to ensure that the amendment has bite as
well as bark. The problem, as James Saturno of the Congressional
Research Service observed, is that a simple majority could "evade
the intent of the requirements for a supermajority vote" by changing the revenue estimate, changing the dates of the fiscal year or
adjusting economic assumptions. 105 Other methods (already used
to circumvent Gramm-Rudman) that would not require three-fifths
approval include: shifting pay dates between fiscal years,·
accelerating or delaying tax collections, delaying spending and
selling government assets. 106 Finally, terms of art such as "outlays"
and "receipts" are also subject to interpretation, as is the question
of whether the budget need be balanced throughout the fiscal
year.107 Both the federal government's experience with GrammRudman and state balanced budget efforts speak of government's
proclivity for budget gimmickry.
The question remains whether the budget amendment will, in a
way that Gramm-Rudman did not, spur Congress and the White
House to increase revenues and reduce expenditures. Amendment
sponsors say "yes," both because a balanced budget, unlike deficit
reduction targets, cannot be recalibrated and because the oath to
uphold the Constitution, as opposed to statutory mandates, will be
respected. us The recalibration argument is not especially con-

103 Hearings, supra note 11, at 206-7 (Vol. II).
104 See generally Moore, supra note 66
105 Cranford, supra note 59, at 1236.
1a> Hearings, supra note 11, at 162-63 (Vol. I) (statement of Robert Reischauer, Director of
Co~essional Budget Office).
1 See Hearings II, supra note 82, at 103-Q7 (statement of Henry Monaghan).
1~ See Senate Report, supra note 7, at 4-5. But see Hearings, supra note 11, at 202 (Vol.
II) (statement of Steven Gold that statutory approaches are as effective as constitutional
approaches).
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vincing. The availability of a three-fifths override and the power
of a simple majority over both outlay estimates and the accounting
of expenditures indicates that a constitutional amendment is unlikely to make a balanced budget involatile.
The constitutional oath argument should not be discounted but
it is also far from compelling. Congress' past felicity to the oath is
uneven. No doubt, Congress often takes this responsibility seriously, carefully scrutinizing the constitutionality and constitutional
implications of its actions-including the enactment of legislation
providing broader individual rights protections than the Supreme
Court.l 09 On other occasions, however, Congress seems quite
unaware of the constitutional oath. 110 One such example is
Gramm-Rudman I, where expediency ruled and constitutional
concerns were pushed aside. m

C. A balanced budget amendment?
Since there is nothing in the Constitution which prevents the
enactment of a statute balancing the budget, the whole debate
over the budget amendment seems a non sequitur. Humorist Dave
Barry (in the most insightful and most enjoyable commentary on
the budget amendment effort) put it this way:
Let's play a little game: Let's pretend that you readers are the
Congress, and you wish to do something about the deficit. Bear in
mind that:
1. You have the power to balance the budget.
2. You have ALWAYS had the power to balance the budget.
3 . So any time you want, you can balance the budget.
4 . Legally, nobody can stop you from balancing the budget.
Okay! So What would you do? Did you answer: "Balance the
budget"? You did? Ha hal This is why you are lowlife working
scum, as opposed to a member of Congress.
What it is doing, amid much fanfare , is talking about passing a

109 For an overview of congressional constitutional interpretation, see generally Louis
Fisher, Constitutional Dialogues (1988); Louis Fisher &. Neal Devins, Political Dynamics of
Constitutional Law (1992).
110 See Abner 1. Mikva, How Well Does Congress Support and Defend the Constitution?,
61 N.C. L. Rev. 58"'7 (1983).
111 See Fisher&. Devins, supra note 109, at 142-60.
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constitutional amendment requiring itself to balance the budget.
Really. This amendment will become effective in a few years if
three-fourths of the states ratify it. Meanwhile, this year Congress
has produced the largest deficit ever. ll2

That an unsuccessful balanced budget statute introduced in 1992
would not fully go into effect for six years (1998) also lends credence to this view of the current Congress passing off the deficit
crisis to a future generation of elected officials.ns
Robert
Reischauer, director of the Congressional Budget Office, echoed
this sentiment in dramatic tesdmony attacking the budget amendment and its sponsors: "In this election year, it would be a cruel
hoax to suggest to the American public that one more procedural
promise in the form of a constitutional amendment is going to get
the job done. " 114 For Reischauer, Congress and the White House
must make "painful decisions to cut specific programs and raise
particular taxes. "115
Reischauer undoubtedly is correct. The budget, with or without a constitutional amendment, will not balance itself. Granted,
as Walter Dellinger aptly commented, it would be wonderful if
we could simply declare by constitutional amendment that the air
would henceforth be clean, the streets would be free of drugs and
the budget balanced forever. But saying those things in the
Constitution does not make them happen. " 116 Hard choices must
indeed be made.
Amendment sponsors recognize this. Why else put off the
amendment's effective date for at least three years? Their claim
simply is that a budget amendment compels the making of hard
choices in a way that Gramm-Rudman and other statutory reforms
do not. 117 This contention should not be rejected out of hand.
Constitutional amendments do create a sense of momentum and

112 Dave Barry, Balancing Acts, Wash. Post, June 28, 1992, (Magazine), at 36. See also
Dave Barry, On the Sidewalk to Ruin, Wash. Post, Feb. 23, 1992, (Magazine), at 36.
113 House debate on this proposal can be found at 138 Cong. Rec. H4351-59 (daily ed.
June 9, 1992); House vote can be found at 138 Cong. Rec. H438S.89 (daily ed. June 9, 1992).
President Bush also disfavored an immediate effective date for the budget amendment. See
138 Cong. Rec. H4498 (daily ed.June 10, 1992) (statement of Rep. Jack Brooks).
114 Hearings, supra note 11, at 171 (Vol. I) (statement of Robert Reischauer).
115 Id.
116 Hearings II, supra note 82, at 112 (statement of Walter Dellinger).
11? Senate Report, supra note 7, at 4-5.
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responsibility that no statute can equal. But are the tugs and pulls
of the political process likely to yield the types of programmatic
cuts and tax increases necessary to balance the budget? Probably
not.
The costs of implementing the budget amendment proposal are
staggering. For example, according to the President's 1993 budget,
the estimated fiscal year 1993 deficit ($350 billion) could not be
balanced through the elimination of Social Security ($300 billion),
Defense ($290 billion), or discretionary domestic programs and
foreign aid ($245 billion). us The Congressional Budget Office offers the following long-range projection: to eliminate the annual
deficit through programmatic cuts would require an eleven percent reduction of all outlays; to eliminate the annual deficit by
raising revenues would require a revenue increase (principally
through new taxes) of about thirteen percent.ll9 Put another way:
the elimination of the deficit requires fundamental changes in the
operation of elected government.
These changes, today at least, seem unattainable. The vast majority of Americans, while supporting a budget amendment, 120 are
unwilling to pay the price for a balanced budget. In a recent
survey, seventy-five percent answered "no" when asked whether
"[t]he government should raise taxes now as one means of dealing
with the federal budget." 121 Instead, most prefer H. Ross Perot's
initial suggestion of eliminating, each year, roughly $180 billion of
fraud, waste and abuse. 122 Who wouldn't? But, as Rep. David
Obey (D-Wisc.) observed, "the last time I looked, there ain't no
line item in the budget for waste, fraud and abuse. " 123
Assuming (the unlikely) that some "waste, fraud and abuse" is
found, it still will not approach the amount of the annual deficit.
If taxes are not increased, programs must be cut. Mter the savings

llS See George Hager, Seven Ways to Cut the Deficit . . . Easier Said Than Done, 1992
Q. Wkly. 1144-45 (May 2, 1992).
ll Letter from Robert Reischauer, Director, Gong. Budget Office, to Sen. Joseph Biden
(M~ 29, 1991), reprinted inS. Rep. No. 103, supra note 7, at 11-12.
1
A 1985 Gallup Poll of over 1000 adults found that 49% supported a balanced budget
amendment, while only 27% were opposed. Search of WESTLAW, Poll Database (October
19,1992).
121 Who Are the Democrats?, Wash. Post, July 12, 1992, at A12.
122 See Hager, supra note 118, at 1144. Perot, of course, subsequently proposed to
balance the budget through a combination of tax hikes and program expenditure cuts.
123 Hearings, supra note 11, at 7 (Vol. II) (statement of Rep. David Obey) .
Con~.
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and loan bailout, the continuing extension of unemployment benefits, a proposed massive urban aid bill in the wake of the L.A. riots
and increasing foreign aid to emerging democracies, the prospects
of significant outlay reductions is daunting. Indeed, from 19811992, only two domestic programs of significance were terminated
by the White House and Congress. 124 While President Bush proposed termination of 246 programs in fiscal year 1993, only $5 billion of a $350 billion deficit would be reduced through these program cuts. 125
Elected government's failure to either reduce expenditures or
increase taxes is hardly a mystery. Elected officials have little incentive to balance the budget. Hearings are filled with witnesses
who benefit from congressional spending. Since the costs of
spending are typically spread throughout the nation, few witnesses oppose spending. A 1990 study by James Payne found a 145
to 1 ratio of witnesses supporting proposed spending. 1~ When this
finding was reported to Congressional staffers, their reaction was
surprise that the gap was not larger. 127 While the incentives for
spending are strong, there is no incentive to finance increased
spending through tax hikes. Elected officials (who want to stay
elected}, therefore, "'enjoy' appropriating money to benefit their
constituents, but they do not 'enjoy' taxing them. " 128
Former
chair of the House Budget Committee James R. Jones (D-Okla.)
summed it up this way: "There is a constituency for national defense. There is a constituency for every item of the domestic budget. There is a loud constituency for tax cuts. But there really is
no constituency for a balanced budget. "129 That future generations
will bear the brunt of this imbalance is a pill that most politicians
are willing to swallow.1!10

124 See Lawrence Haas, Never Say Die, 24 Nat'IJ. 755, 756 (Mar. 28, 1992).
125 Id.
1
~ James L. Payne, The Congressional Brainwashing Machine, Public Interest, Summer
1990, at 4.
127 Id.
128 Eiliot, supra note 6, at 1091 (citing James Buchanan & Robert Wagner, Democracy in
Deficit: Political Legacy of Lord Keynes 93-94 (1977)).
129 Richard SneJling, The Deficit's Clear and Present Danger, N.Y. Times, Mar. 3, 1985,
(M;rzine), at 48, 70.
1 See Elliot, supra note 6, at 1091-92 (discussing the works of public choice theorists
James Buchanan and Richard Wagner); Note, supra note 89, at 1607 (discussing S. Rep. No.
151, 97th Con g., 1st Sess. 34 (1981)).
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The balanced budget amendment assumes that elected government will change. While some change is possible, the cataclysmic
change necessary to balance the budget seems a pipe dream.
Rather than set into place a balanced budget, the amendment is
more likely to spur on gimmickry, litigation and a shift in the balance of powers.

Ill. CONCLUSION: A SYMBOLIC BALANCED BUDGET
AMENDMENT

Limitations on the proposed budget amendment do not foreclose constitutional tinkering in this area. Overwhelming incentives to spend and disincentives to tax will remain, however.
Absent fundamental change affecting either the way we elect public officials or their terms of office, m it is unlikely that elected
officials will impose the costs of a balanced budget (through severe
program cuts or tax increases) on the present generation.
Amendment opponents, stressing these realities, attack both the
proponents' motives and the propriety of constitutional reform.
Pointing to elected government's existing power to balance the
budget, the amendment's delayed effectuation date and the unwillingness of proponents to specify how the budget should be
balanced, opponents perceive this reform effort as opportunistic
at best and dishonest at worst. Rep. David Obey minced no
words when, in addressing the. House of Representatives, he
claimed to "see as many people who remind me of Daffy Duck as I
do Thomas Jefferson, and until I think the proportion gets a little
better, I am a little reluctant to put the Constitution in the hands
or at the mercy of modern-day founding fathers. "132
Obey's argument has substantial force but it goes too far.
Admittedly, a budget amendment that does not alter the fabric of
elected government cannot overcome a political system that rewards spending and punishes tax increases. Along the same lines, a
budget amendment that sets specific policy objectives and then

131 E. Donald Elliot endorses the convening of a Constitutional Convention to examine
such far reaching reform. Elliot, supra note 6 , at 1096-1110.
lS2 138 Cong. Rec. H4500 (dailyed.June 10, 1992) (statement of Rep. David Obey).

1992]

A Symbolic Balanced Budget Amendment

leaves it to the three branches to put those objectives into place
seems doomed. All the same, the symbolic importance of a budget
amendment should not be discounted out of existence.
Constitutional reform is more momentous than statutory
change. Proponents of a balanced budget amendment seize on this
fact to argue that a constitutional amendment demands greater fidelity than a statute. Opponents, in contrast, argue that constitutional change is so momentous that it should be disfavored unless
essential. lM Pointing to weaknesses in the budget amendment, as
well as the availability of statutory alternatives, opponents characterize the amendment as destructive. Their attacks on the specifics
of past budget amendment proposals are well taken. But opponents of a balanced budget amendment are wrong to suggest that
the Constitution is somehow trivialized by an amendment which
encourages elected government to make use of its existing power.
The Constitution is more than simply a set of rules governing the
operation of government. It is also a metaphor for how we want
to live. To say, as John Marshall did in Marbury v. Madison, that
constitutional language must have meaning 1M does not foreclose
statements of aspiration in the Constitution.
What harm would come of a symbolic constitutional amendment stating that "The Congress and President shall seek to balance
the federal budget?"
This language, admittedly, is fluff.
Furthermore, to the extent that the Congress and the President are
presumed, "given adequate power, ... [to] act responsibly for the
public welfare, " 1!15 the amendment is redundant. On the other
hand, the constitutional oath could now be appealed to, and with
some luck misdirected efforts at creating an enforceable budget
amendment could be deflected. A symbolic amendment, moreover, does not trivialize the Constitution. It avoids the pitfalls of
an unworkable amendment while recognizing that the national
debt is one of those "great and extraordinary" 136 matters that
warrants constitutional change.
A symbolic constitutional amendment, by itself, is not enough.
A statute reaffirming the pre-1974 arrangement of presidential

1M See Hearings II, supra note 82, at 98-10~ (statement of Henry Monaghan).
1M Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176-80 (1803).
1!15 Hearings 11, supra note 82, at 102 (statement of Henry Monaghan) .
136 The Federalist No. 49, at 3~9 Uames Madison) Qacob Cooke ed., 1961 ).
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leadership in establishing budget aggregates would also help. 1s7 In
the end, however, elected government must make hard, painful
choices. Programs must be cut and taxes may need to be raised.
Admittedly, there is good reason to doubt democratic accountability on budget matters. But "that is the system provided for in
the Constitution. "138 Unless we are willing to fundamentally
change that system, we must rely on elected government to do the
right thing. A symbolic budget amendment may assist in that effort. The fact that it is a constitutional placebo does not undercut
its value.

137 See supra notes 13-62.
1!18 Mickey Edwards, The Case Against the Line-Item Veto, 1 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics Be
Pub. Pol'y 191 , 194 (1985).

